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Can Anglers Manage
Themselves?
New Ideas for Recreational Fisheries Management
Robert J. Johnston and Jon G. Sutinen

B

obbi Walker’s property is surrounded by towering
hickory trees on the coast of Orange Beach,
Alabama. This modest plot of land contains both her
home and the small office from which she and her family
operate a charter fishing business. Much of her business
relies on red snapper—a popular fish with both recreational
anglers and commercial vessels. Although she is dismayed
to see the sprawl of new condominium developments surrounding her property, she has no plans to leave. As long as
there are fish and anglers who wish to catch those fish,
Walker plans to keep operating in the Gulf of Mexico. When
she talks about her plans, she speaks as an angler, a business
owner, and as a member of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council.
Like many in the Gulf region, Walker is concerned with
the red snapper fishery. She believes that most recreational
anglers comply with guidelines regulating red snapper fishing, but that they are concerned with many aspects of management. It is quickly apparent that anglers in the red
snapper fishery are concerned with a wide range of issues,
including the quantity and size of fish allowed for commercial take, uneven data regarding recreational harvests, a perceived inability of existing size and bag limits to curtail
mortality, and a seasonal closure subject to considerable disagreement.
At first glance Gulf of Mexico red snapper, mid-Atlantic
red drum, mid-Atlantic summer flounder, and New England
striped bass seem to have little in common. However, these
fisheries all share a similar challenge—competition between

commercial and recreational fishers. Many fisheries in the
U.S. support significant commercial and recreational activity. However, recent expansion of combined recreational and
commercial fishing effort has placed fish stocks under substantial pressure in several important fisheries. Fish populations are squeezed between their popularity in fish markets
and their status as a favorite among recreational anglers. For
example, between 1990 and 2000, commercial harvests of
red snapper nearly doubled, while recreational harvests more
than tripled. State and federal regulators have responded by
tightening regulations on both commercial and recreational
fishers. On the recreational side, this has often meant shortening open seasons, reducing bag limits, and increasing minimum sizes. However, pressure on these popular species
continues to increase.
Many of these fisheries also share a second feature: an
increasing dissatisfaction among recreational anglers with
one-size-fits-all management measures. Saltwater recreational fishing restrictions are often applied over large geographic scales. Regulations are criticized for failing to
address important differences among regions or types of
fishing. In addition, anglers often feel that their input has little influence on management.
For example, since 2000 the Gulf of Mexico Fisheries
Management Council (GMFMC) has set the open season for
the recreational red snapper fishery at 194 days, running
from April 21 to October 31. While this season may be fine
for some year-round residents, it effectively closes the fishery to “snowbirds,” or part-time residents who arrive in Gulf
continued on page 12
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of Mexico communities during the popular winter and spring
break fishing seasons. Even during the busy summer season,
half of the recreational red snapper harvest is thrown overboard to comply with bag and size limits. While these
released fish do not count against the “official” recreational
quota, the stress of capture leaves many dead or subject to
easy predation by sharks or dolphins. Indeed, some anglers
describe current bag and size limits as akin to a “feeding program for dolphins,” with little impact on snapper mortality.
Such management shortcomings have led to frustration
among many red snapper anglers and charter operators.
Is there a better way to manage popular recreational
fisheries? Recent experience in commercial fisheries has
shown that rights-based management approaches (individual fishing quotas, or IFQs, are among the best known) are
able to promote sustainable management of fisheries and
generate increased wealth for fishery participants.
Commercial experience has also suggested the benefits of
fishery co-management—or sharing management authority
with those fishery participants who are subject to regulations.
Co-management can in many cases increase voluntary compliance with fishery regulations, decrease enforcement costs,
and increase stakeholders’ satisfaction with management. A
combination of these two concepts—rights-based co-management—may offer a solution to challenges in recreational
fishery management.
Recent collaborative work among the University of
Connecticut, the University of Rhode Island, and the nonprofit group Environmental Defense has suggested a novel
alternative for improving recreational fisheries management.
This alternative would incorporate rights-based management

concepts, and would place more management authority in the
hands of recreational anglers—allowing anglers the authority to devise management measures most appropriate for their
local regions and the species they target.
Can recreational fishermen manage their own fisheries,
in cooperation with government authorities? What would
happen if we allowed recreational anglers the ability to
organize into self-managing cooperatives? The possibility
raises several more questions:
Can Recreational Anglers Really Manage Themselves?
Management authorities have already developed group
and community-based management alternatives in US commercial fisheries. For example, The Pollock Conservation
Cooperative (PCC) is made up of several companies eligible
under the American Fisheries Act to harvest and process pollock in Alaska. Experience has shown these cooperatives to
be effective at sustaining fishery resources and increasing
returns to fishery participants. Although there are important
differences between recreational and commercial fisheries,
there is no reason to expect that similar principles would not
apply to recreational fisheries. With this in mind, the collaborative work group devised the idea of the Angling
Management Organization, or AMO.
An AMO, simply put, would be a large, organized group
of recreational anglers who would jointly manage a specific
recreational fishery, in a specific area. It would give recreational anglers the ability to cooperatively manage their own
fisheries, within limits set by fishery management authorities. For example, for Gulf of Mexico red snapper, one might
establish two AMOs—one for the eastern Gulf and one for
the western Gulf—allowing management to better fit the
needs of anglers in the two distinct regions.
How Would an AMO Work?

Red snapper is a popular catch for commercial and recreational
fishermen alike. Management shortcomings have led to frustrations
among many red snapper fishers.

AMOs would function much like a commercial fishing
cooperative, with recreational anglers acting as shareholders.
These shareholders would elect a managing board, which
would make decisions for the AMO. AMOs would be established in coordination with the appropriate Fishery
Management Council, such that each AMO would have the
exclusive right to manage recreational angling for a particular species, in a particular area. Government authorities
would determine the annual harvest quota, or right, that
would be granted to each AMO. In addition, most management authority currently in the hands of government regulators would be provisionally granted to recreational anglers
themselves, as represented by AMOs. This is the key feature
of AMOs—recreational anglers would be given the ability
and responsibility to address their own management challenges.
continued on page 13
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Members of the AMO would have a renewable right to
manage their quota. However, one would not have to be a
member of an AMO in order to participate in the fishery.
That is, ownership of an AMO share would offer the right to
influence management of the fishery, not the right to harvest
the quota itself. Indeed, AMOs would be required to offer
equal fishing access to any interested angler.
The quota provided to an AMO would be renewable
each year as long as the AMO did not violate its allowable
harvest. Each AMO would have the exclusive right to determine how its quota would be used and managed. An AMO
might sell licenses or fish tags, hold tournaments, set open
and closed seasons, or choose any other of a range of available management measures to ensure that anglers did not
exceed the allowable quota. Almost any management
method would be allowed, as long as it provided equal
access to the fishery to all interested participants. If fishery

ers, much like one would purchase stock in a private company. Hence, membership in any AMO would be open to
any interested party. Rules would be established to limit
share ownership by any one party—such that no single entity could “buy up” excessive control of an AMO.
Would Taxpayers Finance AMOs?
No. AMOs would be largely self-financing, such that
the taxpayer cost of management would actually decline.
How would this happen? AMOs would be free to raise funds
from use of their harvest quota. For example, an AMO
might sell individual fishing licenses or tags that would be
required for every harvested fish, charge tournament entry
fees, or collect revenues from charter operators in return for
certain harvest rights. These monies would allow the AMO
to operate—funding enforcement activity, data collection,
scientific research, and fisheries enhancement projects—
and could also be returned to AMO members as a profit or
dividend. This profit motive could provide additional incentives for AMO members to sustain healthy fish stocks, such
that greater future harvests might be obtained.
If AMOs Are Controlled by Anglers, Won’t They Allow
Too Much Fishing?
An AMO’s right to its harvest quota would only be
renewed as long as it was successful at maintaining harvest
within allowable limits. If an AMO were to repeatedly
allow “too much” fishing, its management rights would be
revoked, management authority would revert to the government, and all shares in the AMO would become worthless.
This would provide a strong incentive for AMOs to provide
effective management, and to maintain harvest within
allowable limits.

Captain Russell Underwood discusses the red snapper fishery
with Environmental Defense biologist Pamela Baker.

stocks became more healthy, federal regulators could
reward the AMO by increasing the allowable harvest right.
However, if an AMO were unable to successfully manage
harvest or otherwise abused its management authority, management authority would be revoked.
Initially, shares in AMOs would be distributed through
an equitable process to current recreational anglers. Once
an AMO was established, any person could become a shareholder simply by purchasing shares from existing sharehold-

Could AMOs Establish Fishing Rules that Would Limit
Fishing to Exclusive Groups?
No. If an AMO did not allow equal fishing access to all
groups, its quota would be revoked. While an AMO would
be free to establish fees for various types of fishery access,
it would not be permitted to establish fees that would eliminate fishing opportunities for less wealthy anglers, or
anglers of particular socioeconomic groups.
Why bother? How would cooperative management
such as AMOs really improve over current
management?
If appropriately applied, AMOs could offer several
important advantages. First, allowing AMOs strong and
renewable rights to a harvest quota would encourage suscontinued on page 14
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tainable, efficient and financially sound use of fishery
resources. Because AMOs would provide the ability for
recreational anglers to manage their own fishery, they would
provide strong incentives for superior and cost-effective
management, greater levels of voluntary compliance, and
the ability to tailor management mechanisms to the particular needs of recreational anglers.
Second, members of AMOs would have a direct stake
in the outcomes of their policies, because they would be
“owners” of a community-based organization. As a fishery
became more healthy and successful, fishing would become
more valuable to anglers. AMO shares—reflecting the ability to manage this increasingly valued resource—would also
become more highly valued. Hence, successful fishery
management on the part of AMOs would have a direct benefit to shareholders—as they would own shares of increasing value. In other words, recreational fishery managers
would face immediate consequences of their decisions.
Successful management would result in greater gains for
shareholders. Unsuccessful management would result in
losses to shareholders, and (perhaps) a revocation of management rights.
In sum, this system would provide strong incentives for
successful management—incentives that do not exist in current management arrangements.
It’s a Big Change…
In early January, 2004, the AMO concept was presented to anglers, regulators, and other stakeholders in the Gulf
of Mexico red snapper fishery. There were many questions.
Would AMOs really work? Would AMOs simply represent
another layer of bureaucracy? How would the boundaries
between waters governed by different AMOs be enforced?
Who would conduct the data collection and scientific
research necessary for management? Clearly, application of
a concept such as AMOs would be complex, and would
require fishery participants and regulators to address many
details and hard questions. Initial set-up costs and effort
could be quite high. However, the ultimate costs of retaining current management methods might also be high. If not
managed effectively, popular fish such as Gulf of Mexico
red snapper will likely become increasingly rare. Even in
places where they may be caught, increasingly stringent
fishing regulations may entirely prevent certain groups from
fishing entirely. Already, many seasonal anglers have no
opportunity to harvest red snapper. However, there are
other options. New ideas in cooperative, rights-based management offer a potential solution to many of the challenges
facing our popular recreational fisheries.
When the red snapper season re-opens in April, anglers
will again crowd Bobbi Walker’s boats, seeking to catch this
prized fish. Today, she has many questions and concerns
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about AMOs—she is not yet convinced that AMOs are a
perfect solution. However, she believes that management of
the red snapper fishery can be improved, and is willing to
consider alternatives. The willingness of regulators and
anglers to consider such alternatives may have critical
impacts on the future sustainability of our popular fisheries.

For fun facts about fish, see the NOAA
Northeast Fisheries Science Center website,
<http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov>.

